初始水权分配中,流域管理者与区域用水户之间存在不对称信息和不同的用水目标,往往导致水资源无法合理分配与高效利用。为提高初始水权分配与利用效率,从流域管理者角度,结合区域及行业用户需求、区域影响因子和行业影响因子,提出基于破产理论的初始水权优化分配框架,得到初始优化方案,进而依据奖惩规则制定监管机制,形成两阶段优化分配方法。将该方法应用于典型流域初始水权分配,并对机制实施与效果调研,结果表明,这一模型不仅可以提高水资源分配效率,还可以有效约束超额用水户行为,不断优化水资源配置效果与提高水资源的利用效率,从而支撑水资源初始水权的合理分配与有效监管。研究成果有利于流域管理者合理分配及利用水资源。
Abstract
During the allocation of initial water rights, the asymmetric information and different water use goals between basin governor and regional water users usually result to unreasonable allocation and inefficient utilization of water resources. To improve the allocation and utilization efficiency, we propose a framework for optimal allocation of initial water rights based on bankruptcy theory from the perspective of the basin governor. We take into consideration the demands of regional and industrial users, regional impact factors and industrial impact factors. Upon obtaining the initial optimization scheme in the first stage, we establish the supervision mechanism according to the reward and punishment rules in the second stage. We applied the model to the initial water rights allocation in typical basins, and investigated the implementation and effectiveness. Results demonstrate that the proposed model could improve the allocation efficiency of water resources on one hand, and restrain the behavior of over-users on the other. Hence, the model could support the reasonable allocation and efficient supervision of initial water rights. The research finding is conducive for watershed managers to rationally allocate and utilize water resources.
关键词
初始水权分配 /
两阶段优化模型 /
改进破产规则 /
验证惩罚机制 /
监管机制
Key words
initial water rights allocation /
two-stage optimal model /
improved bankruptcy allocation rule /
verification and punishment mechanism /
supervision mechanism
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基金
国家社会科学基金重大项目(19ZDA083);国家杰出青年科学基金项目(71725007);国家自然科学基金项目(71673210,51779013);博士基金项目(BK202023,2019KB006);2020湖北省社会科学基金项目(2020187)
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